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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This 1S a rehearing on the appeal of 
defendant-appellant D. 
District Court on his 
John Musselman from a denial by the 
motion to set aside a default and 
default judgment entered against him in the Third .... "!udicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County. 
DISPOSITION 
The court below, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
presiding, entered its order denying Mr. ~1usselm~n's motion 
to set aside the default judgment. This Honorable Court 
initially issued an opinion on July 26, 1982 affirming the 
District Court. On October 8, 1982, this Court granted Mr. 
Musselman's Petition for Rehearing. Mr. Musselman's 
principal brief on rehearing and the brief of the respondent 
State of Utah on rehearing have been submitted to the Court. 
Mr. Musselman therefore submits his reply. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. Musselman seeks a reversal of the District 
Court's denial of his motion to set aside the default 
judgment. 
PRELIMINARY COMMENT 
The substantive reasons mandating the relief 
sought in this appeal are set forth in Mr. Musselman's 
1 
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principal 
ref erred 
brief 
to that 
on rehearing. The court 
brief, filed November 
is respectfully 
9 ' 1982, for Mr. 
Musselman' s primary argument. The analysis in this reply 
brief is necessitated by the substantial confusion created 
by the arguments asserted by counsel for the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The essential facts are set forth in the Statement 
of Facts and Procedural Background sections of Mr. 
Musselman's principal brief on rehearing (see pp. 1-7), and 
there is no need to repeat that statement of facts here. 
It is necessary here to address several 
substantial inaccuracies in the "Statement of Facts" 
contairied in the brief on rehearing of the respondent State 
of Utah which are highly relevant to the determination of 
the issues in this case. In its ''Statement of Facts," 
counsel for the State has made several material assertions 
which are not supported by the record and which are, indeed, 
untrue. These include the following: 
1. The State asserts in its brief (p. 2) that 
Mrs. Coram ''assigned to the State the right to recover as 
against any liable third party these medical expenses . " 
No such assignment is evidenced anywhere in the record. 
Moreover, 
requested 
requested 
though a copy of the alleged assignment was 
by Mr. Musselman and has subsequently been 
on several occasions by his counsel, no such 
2 
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assignment has ever been provided to Mr. Musselman or his 
counsel. 
2. The State asserts in its brief (p. 2) that 
Mr. Musselman was retained to represent Mrs. Coram in 1979. 
In fact, Mr. Musselman was first contacted by Mrs. Coram and 
retained in the Fall of 1977, and the medical mal~)ractice 
action on behalf of Mrs. Coram was commenced in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah in October 
1978, a period of several months prior to the enactment of 
the Medical Benefits Recovery Act. 
record. 
3. The State further asserts in its brief (p. 3): 
Prior to proceeding with the case, 
defendant-appellant contacted the St ate 
of Utah, Office of Recovery Services and 
inquired as to the State's Medicaid 
claim of $82, 522. 22 and thereafter 
~reed to collect the said sum ou~_of 
any recovery, taking for his services 
the statutory 25% contingency fee. 
This assertion is totally without support in the 
Mr. Musselman' s correspondence with the State is 
found on pp. 40-43 and 46-48 of the record (hereinafter 
''R. " ) . It is readily apparent that this correspondence 
contains no agreement that Mr. Musselman would act to 
collect the State's claim out of any recovery or represent 
the State of Utah. Mr. Musselman first contacted ~he Sta~e 
in June, 1979 approximately 8 months subsequent to the 
filing of the complaint in the medical malpractice action. 
and it is plainly discernible from M~. Musselman's letter of 
3 
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June 15, 1979 (R., p. 40) that he merely makes inquiry to 
ascertain whether the State intended to make any claim. 
The record contains nothing more than belated, 
self- serving, and unsupported declarations by counsel for 
the State that Mr. Musselman agreed to represent the State. 
The record is devoid of evidence of any such agree:nent on 
the part of Mr. Musselman. Other arguments relied upon by 
the State in its attempt to show that Mr. Musselman was 
supposedly representing the State which are found in the 
''Statement of Facts" and elsewhere in the State's brief will 
be considered in Section III of the argument below. 
4. In its brief (p. 4), counsel for the State 
accuses Mr. Musselman of diverting State monies to his own 
use. This allegation is without foundation and the 
inference of misconduct which counsel for the State intends 
the reader to draw is untrue. Mr. Musselman has at all 
times held and exercised control over the settlement 
proceeds consistently with the desires and wishes of his 
client, Mrs. Coram. 
Moreover, it has nowhere been established that the 
funds held by Mr. Musselman were the State's funds. Indeed, 
the State's "Statement of Facts" simply assumes a conclusion 
to all of the legal issues raised by the defenses which Mr. 
Musselman asserts and which are now before the court in 
considering Mr. Musselman's motion to set aside the default 
judgment. 
4 
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5. The State also asserts in its brief (p. ~) 
that the State commenced the instant case "after many 
promises to account were not kept.'' The record is deYoid of 
any such alleged '' . promises to account." To the cont r3.ry, 
the record clearly shows that Mr. Musselman~ as Mrs. Cor~m's 
counsel, was negotiating with representatives of the State 
for settlement of a disputed claim. 
The ''Statement of Facts'' in the State's brief 
contains several serious inaccuracies and unsupported 
allegations, and assumes conclusions to issues now before 
this Honorable Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO EVEN ADDRESS A~Y OF THE 
MERITORIOUS DEFENSES ANALYZED IN MR. ~1USSEL:-1.At~' S 
------
PRINCIPAL BRIEF .. AND ATTEMPTS TO DISMISS COM.PELLING 
-- -
REASONS FOR REVERSAL MERELY BY THE t;SE OF 
INFL~'1M.ATORY ACCUSATIONS 
In its brief, the State concedes that the two 
general issues presented by a motion to set aside a default 
judgment are (1) whether excusable neglect is shown and (2) 
whether a meritorious defense has been tendered, at least so 
as to justify a trial of the issues thus raised. 
In his principal brief on rehearing, Mr. Musselman 
has demonstrated that the cause of action upon which the 
default judgment is predicated does not assert any claim 
against him upon which any relief may be granted, and that 
5 
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he, as Mrs. Coram's attorney, has 
obligation for any debt of his client 
therefore, that no judgment may 
personally. 
no primary personal 
or beneficiary, and, 
be had against him 
Mr. Musselman further demonstrated that the State 
could not assert any claim at all under the Medical E2nefits 
Recovery Act, inasmuch as the statute is not retroactive anj 
did not take effect until after the last payment on behilf 
of Mrs. Coram. Moreover, the statute of limitations hau run 
prior to the filing of the State's complaint in this action. 
Mr. Musselman demonstrated that the State failed 
to follow the prescribed statutory procedure to perfect a 
lien, and that the State failed to pursue the proper remedy 
prescribed by the statute to enforce a subrogation claim. 
The State also failed to adjust its claim by the statutorily 
required formula. 
Mr. Musselman also showed that the State made no 
claim based on any written assignment. 
Finally, Mr. Musselman demonstrated that 
regardless of whether the State· s claim was based on a 
written assignment or upon the Medical Benefits Recovery 
Act, the State has no subrogation claim inasmuch as Mrs. 
Coram was not made whole by the settlement of the medical 
malpractice action. 
In its brief, counsel for the State has not 
addressed any of the substantive meritorious defenses, 
6 
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several of which are compelling as a matter of 1 ~l\.: . 
Instead, the State simply attempts to dismiss them by 
nothing more than the use of inflammatory accusations. 
Counsel for the State ' only s response is to claim that ~:-. 
Musselman has "employed a myriad of arguments presented in 
an obscure, and alternative array, many of which .1ctua 11 v 
.I 
contradict each other. This production of weak if not 
insipid and redundant attempts at defenses should not dete~ 
this honorable court. '' (Brief of Respondent on 
Rehearing, p. 9). The State goes on to assert that ''The 
brief of the defendant-appellant is an insult to the 
intelligence and integrity of this court and is a last gasp 
attempt by the defendant " (Brief of Respondent on 
Rehearing, p. 13). 
The State has not provided even a single sentence 
in support of these unprofessional accusations and Mr. 
Musselman refuses to dignify them with any further response. 
The several meritorious defenses which compel 
reversal of the lower court's denial of Mr. Musselman' s 
motion to set aside remain uncontradicted. 
7 
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II. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS NECESSARILY PREDICATED 
ONLY UPON THE "FIRST CAVSE OF ACTION'' OF THE 
STATE'S COMPLAINT, AND ANY QUESTION OF WHETHER 
MR. MUSSELMAN REPRESENTED THE STATE IS THEREFORE 
IRRELEVANT 
In its brief, the State bases its claim that the 
default judgment should be sustained solely on the ground 
that Mr. Musselman was supposedly acting as a lawyer for the 
State. The State does not even assert any other ground on 
which it claims the default judgment should be sustained. 
To make this argument, however, the State must try 
to dodge express rules of law respecting default judgments 
and the unavoidable implications of its own actions. 
A. If It Had Been Intended that the Default 
Judgment be Based at All on the 
"Second Cause of Action,'' It Could Easily 
Have Been So Formulated 
In its complaint, the State asserted two separate 
"causes of action," each with a separate prayer for relief. 
In the "First Cause of Action," the State demanded :::-ecovery 
of $82,522.22. Though both Mr. Musselman and Mrs. Coram 
were named as defendants, this claim was based solely on the 
State's claimed right of subrogation to the settlement 
proceeds received by Mrs. Coram, and specifically alleged 
that Mr. Musselman did not represent the State (see ~9, R., 
p. 3) . In the "Second Cause of Action," the State pled 
specifically in the alternative that Mr. Musselman 
8 
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represented the State, "·ith a specific prayer for $.61~8~1.66 
plus exemplary damages. 
The same counsel for the State who prepared the 
complaint, Mr. Leon Halgren, also prepared the default 
judgment (see R., p. 9). (Mr. Halgren has represented the 
State throughout these proceedings.) The default ~ udgment 
provided that default judgment was entered against Mr. 
Musselman in the sum of $82, 522. 22, the exact amount of 
relief demanded in the prayer of the "First Cause of 
Action.'' It is readily apparent that counsel for the State 
prepared the default judgment based upon the first claim 
only. 
Had the State intended that default judgment be 
entered on the "Second Cause of Action,'' or on both causes 
of action, the default judgment could easily have been 
formulated to reflect either of those positions. 1 Instead, 
1This would, of course, require a provision that the amount 
of punitive damages, requested in the "Second Cause of 
Action," would be determined by the Court at a later 
hearing, inasmuch as it would be error to award punitive 
damages without proof. Securitv Adjustment Bureau. Inc. v. 
West. 20 U.2d 292, 437 P.2d 214 (1968). It would have been 
a simple matter for counsel for the State to include such a 
provision. 
9 
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the default judgment provided only for judgment in the 
amount prayed for in the "First Cause of Action," and made 
no mention of the specific sum requested in the "Second 
Cause of Action." The State admits this fact in its brief 
(p. 14). Indeed, it is apparent that the State desired that 
the default judgment be entered on the ''First C._1.use of 
Action'' because it desired relief in the greater of the two 
amounts. 
B. If the Def~ult Judgment Were Based on 
the "Second Cause of Action .. " It would 
be Void Because the Relief Granted is 
Different in Kind and Greater in Amount 
than that Requested in the ''Second Cause 
of Action" 
The State now faces the difficulty of having 
contradicted itself, attempting now to sustain the default 
judgment entered on the ''First Cause of Action," where it 
specifically alleges that Mr. Musselman was not the la~yer 
for the State, on the ground that Mr. Musselman supposedly 
was the lawyer for the State. Counsel for the State 
attempts to avoid this problem by arguing that the default 
judgment was not based upon either of the specific claims of 
the complaint. This argument runs afoul of the mandate of 
Rule 54(c)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
provides: 
Judgment by Default. A judgment by 
default shall not be different in kind 
from.. or exceed in amount, that 
specifically prayed for in the demand 
for judgment. [Underlining supplied.] 
10 
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This rule is practically identical to the first 
sentence of Rule 54(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
from which the Utah rule is derived. As stated by Professor 
Moore: 
A default judgment cannot give to th~ 
claimant greater relief than the pleaded 
claim entitles him to, and Rule 54(c) 
provides that such a judgment "shall not 
be different in kind from or exceed in 
amount that prayed for in the demand for 
judgment." Since the prayer limits the 
relief granted in a judgment by default, 
both as to the kind of relief and the 
amount, the prayer must be sufficiently 
specific that the court can follow the 
mandate of the Rule. 
6 Moore's Federal Practice ~54.61 at 231 [underlining 
supplied]. 
A default judgment entered 1n violation of this 
rule is void. As the court held in Davis v. Bafus, 3 
Wash.App. 164, 473 P.2d 192 (1970): 
A default judgment granting relief which 
differs from the prayer of the complaint 
is a void judgment. 
473 P.2d at 193 [underlining supplied]. Similarly, the 
court in Southern Arizona School for Boys. Inc. v. 
119 Ariz. 277, 580 P. 2d 738 (Ariz .App., 1978) held: 
A judgment in a default case that awards 
relief that either is more than or 
different in kind from that requested is 
null and void. 
580 P. 2d at 744. [underlining supplied]. 
A default judgment awarding a specific sum of 
$82,522.22 with no reference to punitiYe damages is one 
11 
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which awards relief different in kind and greater in amount 
than that requested in a claim which demands $61,891.66 plus 
punitive damages. The latter is the relief demanded in the 
''Second Cause of Action'' of the State's Complaint. 
Therefore, the "Second Cause of Action" cannot be the basis 
of a default judgment awarding the relief granted here, and 
any such judgment based thereon would be void. 
C. The Default Judgment Could Only Be Sustained 
If at All, on the "First Cause of Action" 
and the State's Theory that Mr. Musselman 
Supposedly Acted as a Lawyer for the State 
is Therefore Irrelevant 
The default judgment can only be sustained, if it 
can be sustained at all, on the "First Cause of Action,'' 
where the State specifically alleges that there was no 
attorney-client arrangement between Mr. Musselman and the 
State. 
Thus, the State's repeated protestations that Mr. 
Musselman supposedly acted as counsel for the State are 
irrelevant to the default judgment, and cannot be used as a 
basis to support the default judgment. Consequently, the 
State has failed to advance even a single argument contrary 
to the several meritorious defenses set forth in Mr. 
Musselman' s principal brief on rehearing. 
12 
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III. EVEN IF THE ''SECO~D CAUSE OF ACTIO~" ~;ERE 
RELEV-~NT TO THE DEFAULT JUDGME~T .. IT IS N0\"1-IERE 
ESTA~LISHED I!\ THE RECORD THAT MR. MUSSELMAN A-CTED 
AS AN ATTORNEY FOR THE STAIE, AND MR. MUSSEL:l.\K INFACT 
DID ~OT REPRESENT THE STATE 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the "Second Cause of 
Action" of the State's complaint could somehow be regarded 
as a part of the default judgment, it would be a mer1:orious 
defense to demonstrate that Mr. Musselman was not acting as 
an attorney for the State. (The State, of course, as the 
plaintiff in this action, has the burden of proving its 
allegation in the first instance.) Though the initial 
decision of this Court indicated an assumption that Mr. 
Musselman had agreed to act for the State, it will be seen 
that the record contains no such agreement. 
A. Mr. Musselman' s Tendered Answer Contains 
No Admission or Assert:ion that He Acted as 
a Lawyer for the State 
In his tendered answer (R., p. 30), Mr. Musselman 
denied the allegations contained in paragraph 11 of the 
complaint ( R. ' p. 4) ' wherein Mr. Halgren asserted 
specifically that Mr. Musselman represented the State. 
In its Brief, the State simply ignores this 
response and attempts to construe another portion of Mr. 
Musselman's tendered answer as an admission that he acted as 
an attorney for the State. In paragraph 9 of the complaint, 
in the claim based upon the State's subrogation theory, the 
State alleged that there ~as no contract between Mr. 
13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Musselman and the State providing for payment of an 
attorney's fee for recovery of the $82~522.22, and that the 
State was therefore entitled to recover the entire sum from 
Mr. Musselman. Mr. Musselman responded to this allegation 
with a general denial. 
The import of the general denial of the 
allegations of paragraph 9 is simply to deny that the State 
is entitled to recover against Mr. Musselman. Mr. 
Musselman's denial of the State's right to recover cannot ue 
construed as an admission of the existence of an 
attorney-client relationship. That relationship is 
expressly denied in Mr. Musselman' s answer to the State's 
second claim. Counsel for the State would have us believe 
the tortuous argument that the general denial of paragraph 
9, through the process of an inferred double negative, was 
in fact an affirmative assertion on the . part of Mr. 
Musselman that a contract of representation did exist 
between Mr. Musselm.J.n and the State. Such an attempted 
construction of the pleadings is not credible and warrants 
little comment. 
B. The State Seriously Misconstrues the Meaning 
of the Statutorv Adjustment Provision and 
Mr. Musselman's References Thereto, and 
Mr. Musselman Had No Expectation of Being 
Paid Any Attorney's Fee by the State 
The State misconstrues and takes out of context 
two sentences from Mr. Musselman' s letter of February 3, 
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1981 to the Office of Recovery SerYices, and ignores ~ir. 
Musselman's specific testimony regarding this letter. It is 
apparent from the text of the letter that Mr. Musselm~n. '"1S 
Mrs. Coram's attorney, is negotiating \.v·ith the State for the 
settlement of a disputed claim of the State. The FOrtion of 
the letter quoted on page 10 of the State's brief is Mr. 
Musselman's calculation of the approximate maximum amount of 
any potential claim by the State according to the statuto~y 
adjustment formula set forth in the section then codified as 
§55-15d-8, Utah Code Ann. 
Though Mr. Musselman refers to this provision 
perhaps somewhat inarticulately by referring to it as the 
"statutory 25~~ for attorney's fees." the reference to the 
statut6ry provision is nonetheless apparent and nowhere does 
Mr. Musselman indicate that he had any expectation of being 
paid any attorney's fee by the State. The attempt by the 
State to place such an interpretation on this language 
seriously misconstrues the clear meaning of the statutory 
provision and the language of Mr. Musselman's letter. 
Section 55-15d-8(4), Utah Code Ann. (subsequently recodified 
as §26-19-7(4), Utah Code Ann.) provides: 
Where the action is brought by the 
beneficiary alone, and the beneficiary 
incurs a personal liability to pay 
attorney's fees and costs of litigation, 
the department's claim for reimbursement 
of the benefits provided to the 
beneficiary shall be limited to the 
amount of the medical expenditures for 
the benefit of the beneficiary less 25 
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percent, which percent represents the· 
department's reasonable share of 
attorney's fees paid by the beneficiary, 
and less that portion of the cost of 
litigation expenses determined by 
multiplying the cost of litigation 
expenses by the ratio of the full amount 
of expenditures over the full amount of 
the judgment, award, or settlement. 
[Underlining supplied. J 
It is thus readily apparent this provision does 
not provide that the State pays any fees to an attorney in 
exchange for some sort of work on behalf of the State in 
obtaining a recovery, but is instead an adjustment of the 
amount the State is allowed to recover in order to reflect a 
reasonable share of the burden of the personal liability fer 
attorney's fees incurred by the beneficiary. 
At the hearing held in the District Court on 
August 18, 1981, Mr. Halgren asked Mr. Musselman if he was 
talking about taking a fee from the State in this portion of 
his letter of February 3, 1981. Mr. Musselman pointed out 
in testimony: 
Transcript 
In that paragraph I mention attorney's 
fees. I did not ever indicate that I 
would be paid by the State of Utah in 
attorney fees. What I did indicate ~·as 
that pursuant to the statute citation, 
which I don't recall at the moment, that 
Mrs. Coram was entitled to reimbursement 
for her attorney fees, and I believe 
that is the way the statute reads~ and 
that was I believe the content of that 
paragraph. 
of Hearing August 18' 1981, pp. 12-13 
t ·.1nderlining supplied]. The State, however, ignores the 
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plain import of the statutory l J.ngu~ge as ~el1 ..lS "-A~· • J ~ • 
Musselm~n's direct testimony in the matter. 
In its ''Statement of Facts '' (p. 5 ) , counsel for 
the State claims that in his testimony at this hearing .. :---~r. 
Musselman ''admitted under oath the fee arrangement." Tl:e 
testimony quoted above, however, is only t c- st imonv 
pertaining to the issue. It is difficult to see how ~1r. 
Musselman ''admitted under oath the fee arrangement" when his 
testimony above is directly to the contrary. 
The State then asserts in its brief (p. 10) that 
in " every subsequent 1 ,, etter .. Mr. Musselman mentioned 
attorney's fees "which the State of Utah is exEectes! to p~ 
him for his legal services.'' (Emphasis by cour.sel for the 
St ate. ) Contrary to this interesting assertion.. the re is 
not one instance in any subsequent letter of Mr. Musselman 
indicating any expectation that the State of Utah would pay 
him anything for any legal services. The State's further 
allegation in its Brief (p. 15) that Mr. Musselman "still 
maintains" in his principal brief on rehearing before this 
court that ,, l 1e expected the statutory fee of 25~~ of the 
recovery as his attorney's fees" is similarly a plainly 
unsupportable interpretation of the defense set .forth in 
that section of the argument in Mr. Musselman' s principal 
brief. Nowhere in Mr. Musselman's principal brief does he 
make any claim that he expected a fee of 25% of any 
recovery, or any other fee .. from the State. 
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C. Mr. Musselman Had Specific Authority to 
Negotiate the Settlement Draft Which He 
Endorsed. and Mr. Musselman's Endorsement 
Does Not Demonstrate that He Acted as 
Counsel for the State 
The State places great emphasis on the settlement 
draft which was issued to the respective payees Li:1da Ann 
Coram, William Dyerl Coram. D. John Musselman, and the 
Office of Recovery Services, and which was endorsed by Mr. 
Musselman for the Office of Recovery Services. The Stat~·s 
argument that this demonstrates that Mr. Musselman had acted 
as counsel for the State ignores the fact that Mr. Musseinan 
had been given specific authority to endorse the particular 
instrument and withhold the amount which would represent the 
State's possible claim. 
At the hearing held on August 18, 1981. Mr. 
Halgren made the same argument made here as follows: 
He also - - and I have an exhibit here 
which I think he won't deny his 
signature on it's the settlement 
draft in the sum of $82,522.22 showing 
that it was payable to the State of Utah 
as recovery services, and it was 
endorsed by John D. Mussellman [sic]. 
It's attorney at law, and in fact I 
don't see how at this point he can deny 
that he was representing the State of 
Utah unless he wants to admit that 
signature is a forgery on that draft. 
Mr. Musselman responded: 
With regard to the check which was 
endorsed, Your Honor, that was drafted 
after a telephone conversation with an 
employee of the State of Utah where that 
\.;as stated and agreed to" and I stated 
18 
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to the employee, and I t!1ink Mr. Hubbard 
is aware of this, I believe it's Mr. 
George Martindale, I stated to Mr. 
Martindale I intended to withhold from 
distribution to ~rs. Corum [sic] the 
amount which I ~ould cal2ulate under the 
statute that the state had a first clai!n 
of lien, the first lien claim upon. I 
have done that, and that's really the 
issue in this case. But to allow the 
state to go on ~ith execution on my 
personal and real property pending a 
determination or litigation of that 
clai1!!, I think would be absolutely 
improper. . . 
Transcript of Hearing, August 18, 1981, pp. 5-6 [underlining 
supplied] . 
At that hearing, in response to a question by Mr. 
Halgren as to whether he was representing the State ''in the 
$82, 52~. 22 recovery"" Mr. Musselman also testified: 
If you are asking about the $82 "000. 00 
check, the answer is that I had felt 
that I had specific authori tv to cash 
that check and withhold the statutory 
amount which the State of Utah would 
have a lien claim on. 
Transcript of Hearing, August 18, 1981, p. 13 [underlining 
supplied]. Nothing to the contrary appears in the record. 
In short, Mr. Musselman was authorized to 
negotiate the draft and withhold the funds until the 
potential claim by the State could be resolved, which was 
then the subject of negotiations between Mr. Musselman, 
acting on behalf of Mrs. Coram, and counsel and 
representatives of the State. 
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The draft upon which the State relies does not 
establish that Mr. Musselman represented the State. 
Similarly, the State's assertion in its brief (p. 
11) that Mr. Musselman admitted that he accepted the 
settlement amount "as a representative of the State" is 
without support in Mr. Musselman's testimony and simply 
misconstrues his testimony quoted above. 
D. It is Unrealistic to Believe that the State 
- --Did or Would Have Entered Into An Arrangement 
Involving Obvious Conflict and Risk to Its 
Own Interest in the Present Circumstances 
Aside from the inconsistencies between the State's 
argument and the record and testimony before this Court, the 
implausibility of the State's theory that Mr. Musselman 
acted as a lawyer on behalf of the State is perhaps more 
forcefully demonstrated by the State's negotiating with Mr. 
Musselman for the settlement of a potential claim. It is 
apparent from the correspondence in the record (see pp. 
41-43, 46-48) that ~r. Musselman was negotiating for a 
reduction of the State's potential claim and was doing so on 
behalf of and in the interest of his client, Mrs. Coram. 
Mr. Martindale, for the Office of Recovery Services, would 
not have been negotiating on this basis with Mr. Musselman 
and discussing counteroffers or possible counteroffers had 
Mr. Musselman 1n fact been acting as the lawyer for the 
State. Not only would Mr. Musselman not have permitted 
himself to be placed in such a position of obvious conflict. 
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but, perhaps more importantly, it is unrealistic to belie\·c: 
that the State would have entered into such an arru.ngement 
which would involve such risk to its own interest in the 
first place. 
E. Mr. Musselman Has At a Minimum Proffered a 
Defense of at Least Suf fiCientOstensible 
Merit as to Require a Trial of the Issue 
In summary, even if the allegation that Mr. 
Musselman had acted as an attorney for the State were of any 
relevance to or were any part of the default judgment here, 
it is readily apparent that the record does not support the 
State's theory that Mr. Musselman acted as a lawyer for the 
State, and the default judgment cannot be sustained on such 
a theory. For the reasons analy:::ed above, Mr. Musselman 
has, at a very minimum, proffered a defense "of at least 
sufficient ostensible merit as would justify a trial of the 
issue thus raised." Downev State Bank v. Major-Blaken~ 
Corp, 545 P.2d 507, at 510 (Utah, 1976). Therefore, even if 
the question of whether Mr. Musselman had acted as an 
attorney for the State had any bearing on the default 
judgment, the default judgment must nonetheless be set 
"d 2 as1 e. 
2 The State is not deprived of the opportunity at 
trial, after the default judgment is properly set aside, to 
try to prove its theory that Mr. Musselman acted as counsel 
for the State. 
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IV. EXCUSABLE NEGLECT WAS BOTH NECESSARILY FOUND BY THE 
LOWER COURT AND THIS COURT AND ESTABLISHED IN THE 
RECORD 
In its brief (p. 8) ' the State takes the 
interesting position that excusable neglect is both not an 
issue before this court and is, supposedly, conclusively 
negated by the record. This argument is intrig·-~ing 1n 
light of the fact, which the State admits in its brief no 
less than three times, that the ruling of the lower court 
denying Mr. Musselman's motion to set aside was based soleiy 
on the lower court's view that no meritorious defense nad 
been shown. 
If the question of excusable neglect is, as the 
State _asserts, not properly before this court, then the 
default judgment certainly cannot be sustained on an 
argument that no excusable neglect was shown. If the issue 
of excusable neglect is before the court, then the import of 
the lower court's ruling and the initial opinion of this 
court must be addressed. 
As demonstrated in Mr. Musselman's principal brief 
on rehearing, the lower court necessarily found that 
excusable neglect was shown, inasmuch as it proceeded to 
rule upon the issue of whether a meritorious defense had 
been tendered. The initial opinion of this Court did so 
also. The State now attempts to get around the implication 
of these decisions by arguing that the lower court did not 
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need to rule on the issue of excusable ne;l ;Ct since it 
ruled on the question of a meritorious defense. 
The State's argument overlooks ar.d :_s inconsistent 
with the principle established in this cot:_·t' s decision ln 
Board of Education of Granite School D~~-~rict v. Cox .. 14 
U.2d 285, 384 P.2d 806 (1963). Thereir, this COl!rt held 
that the question of a meritorious defen e arises only after 
consideration of the question of excu ·.able neglect.. and a 
sufficient excuse being shown. (Thi3 opinion is quoted in 
Mr. Musselman' s principal brief or rehearing at p. 25.) 
Therefore, it is necessarily implic_t in the lowe~ court's 
ruling that excusable neglect or i~1~ ~vertence was found. 
The State also now g es on to argue that Mr. 
Musselman cannot claim excusable neglect or 
inadvertence was involved in h~3 not filing a timely answer. 
The basis for this argument is that Mr. Musselman \.ias 
admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital a few days after the 
20-day period from the tim~ of service had run. While this 
is so, Mr. Musselman'~ illness, hospitalization, and 
subsequent period of ~onvalescence prevented him from 
communicating further w~th counsel for the State during that 
period. In his argum _.nt to the Court below, Mr. Halgren 
asserted a lack of c~mmunication from Mr. Musselman during 
the same period -c: time which Mr. Musselman was 
hospitalized as tie reason that he (Mr. Halgren) had 
contacted Mr. Mar~indale of the Office of Recovery Services 
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and ir:s = ru ct ed him to contact Mr. Musselman. (See 
Transcri?t of Hearing, November 3, 1981~ p. 17.) 
I:"'.. his affidavit filed with the court below (see 
R., pp. 26-:7), Mr. Musselman sets forth the understanding 
which he had with counsel for the State that they would 
endeavor to se~tle the matter and that no default Judgment 
would be taken ~ithout prior notice to allow Mr. Musselman 
time to answer ti~e complaint. Further, in the hearing held 
in the court be~ ~ ~n Mr. Musselman's motion to set aside on 
November 3, 1981, >!r. Musselman stated to the Court: 
The other ground is that from the 
initial fi ~ing and service of the 
complaint iL this matter within a few 
days of th~~, I did talk with Mr. 
Halgren. TL is was before I was 
hospitalizec. had a telephone 
conversation with him. And my 
understanding i:l that conversat:ion was 
the conclusion of which that each of 
would endeavor to settle the matter 
without the necessity of filing an 
answer, and tha:: !.1e would not take a 
default judgme~t without at least 
contacting me before- entering it. 
Transcript of Hearing, NovE:mcer 3, 1981, pp. 13-14. Mr. 
Halgren alleges in his affidavit. though it is hearsay~ that 
Mr. Martindale talked to Mr. Mus~-;elman on July 6 .. 1981 and 
informed him that counsel for State ~as preparing to 
enter a default. On that date. L-:. Musselman h~d barely 
returned home from the hospital, h :.ving been released on 
July 4, and was just beginning :wo-week recuperation 
period. Because of his illness, Mr. ~il".sselman v."as still in 
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no position to prepare and file an answer to the State· s 
complaint at that time. 
Mr. Musselman did, however 
' 
beginning on July 7~ 
1981 and on several occasions thereafter, attempt to contact 
Mr. Halgren by telephone, as demonstrated by his affidavit 
in the record (R., p. 27). Indeed, on July 13, 1931._ the 
day prior to the entry of the default judgment, Mr. 
Musselman reached Mr. Halgren' s office and waited on the 
line for a substantial period of time waiting to speak witl: 
him. For some reason, Mr. Halgren did not take the call 
from Mr. Musselman, and the next day arranged for entry of 
the default judgment without returning Mr. Musselman's call. 
(See Transcript of Hearing, November 3, 1981" p. 13.) Under 
these circumstances, Mr. Musselman's conduct clearly 
constituted inadvertence or excusable neglect. Indeed, the 
facts suggest that the State knowingly took advantage of Mr. 
Musselman's condition. 
The understanding between Mr. Musselman 
Halgren that default would not be entered was 
consistent with the parties' prior negotiations 
and Mr. 
entirely 
and the 
cir::umstances surrounding the filing of the complaint. It 
is apparent from the documents which Mr. Halgren at~ached to 
his own affidavit and which are part of the record (see pp. 
49-50) that the complaint was filed prior to the time that 
Mr. Halgren received Mr. Musselman's most recent settlement 
offer in writing, at a time when Mr. Halgren was under the 
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impression, which turned out to be incorrect, that no 
settlement offer was forthcoming. Mr. Musselman and 
representatives of the State had engaged in substantial 
settlement negotiations prior to that time. In such 
circumstances, an understanding that no default would be 
taken without notice and opportunity to answer. in order to 
avoid the difficulties of litigation and facilitate the 
negotiations, is both reasonable and common. 
In short, both the lower court and the prior 
opinion of this Court were correct in the view that Mr. 
Musselman had demonstrated excusable neglect. 
V. THE STATE HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY OF THE 
---
ASSUMED FACTS RELIED UPON BY THIS COURT IN ITS 
INITIAL DECISION 
In the initial opinion of this Court rendered on 
July 26, 1982, it was assumed that Mr. Musselman had 
admitted a right of subrogation in favor of the State 
pursuant to the Medical Benefits Recovery Act, as well as a 
right of subrogation pursuant to a written assignment 
executed by Mrs. Coram. These assumptions appear to have 
been based upon the unsupported allegations asserted by the 
State. Not only were neither of these assumed facts 
supported by the record or admitted by Mr. Musselman, but 
the State has failed to produce any support for them 
whatsoever. Indeed, the State has not even addressed these 
questions. 
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The State has, therefore, entirely failed to 
demonstrate any basis upon which the default judgment could 
be sustained. 
CONCLUSIO~~ 
In summary, the State has failed to address any ,.. o: 
the meritorious defenses analy::ed in Mr. Mus.3elman' s 
principal brief, and the State has done nothing more than to 
attempt to dismiss them by the use of inflammatory 
accusations. Mr. Musselman's def ens es remain 
uncontradicted. Several are compelling as a matter of law, 
and, indeed, require dismissal of the "First Cause of 
Action'' in the court below as \.;ell as setting aside the 
default judgment. 
The State has not advanced even a single argument 
to show how the "First Cause of Action" states any claim for 
relief against Mr. Musselman or how he has any primary 
personal obligation for any debt of his client. Nor has the 
State advanced any argument contrary to Mr. Musselman's 
showing that the State has no claim under the Medical 
Benefits Recovery Act, inasmuch as the Act is not 
retroactive and the statute of limitations had run. Nor has 
the State advanced any argument contrary to Mr. Musselman's 
showing that the State has no claim of subrogation under any 
theory inasmuch as Mrs. Coram was not made whole. 
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The default judgment was necessarily predicated 
upon the "First Cause of Action'' only. Had it been intended 
that it be based to any extent on the ''Second Cause of 
A . " ct1on, it could easily have been so formulated. More 
importantly, had the default judgment here been based upon 
the ''Second Cause of Action," it would be a void -~ udgment 
inasmuch as the relief granted is different in kind from and 
exceeds the relief demanded in the "Second Cause of .Acticn." 
The default judgment can therefore only be based on the 
"First Cause of Action,'' where the State specifically 
alleges that Mr. Musselman was not the lawyer for the State. 
The default judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained on the 
basis of the State's lengthy assertions that Mr. Musselman 
acted as a lawyer for the St ate. 
Moreover, even if the State's assertion that Mr. 
Musselman acted as a lawyer for the State were relevant, the 
record does not establish that Mr. Musselman acted in any 
such capacity. The State's argument twists the meaning of 
Mr. Musselman's tendered answer and seriously misconstrues 
the relevant statutory provisions and the references thereto 
by Mr. Musselman. The State's theory also overlooks Mr. 
Musselman's specific authority to negotiate the settlement 
draft on which the State relies, and is, in addition, 
implausible under the circumstances of the present case. 
Finally, excusable neglect or inadvertence on the 
part of Mr. Musselman was necessarily and correctly found by 
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the lower court and this Court, and the fact of excusJ.ble 
neglect is amply supported by the record. 
It is therefore unavoidable that the lower court's 
denial of Mr. Musselman' s motion to set aside must be 
reversed. The fundamental principle. consistently 
recognized by this Court, that courLs should act to permit 
full inquiry and that each party to a controversy should be 
afforded an opportunity to present his side of the case. 
Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co." 14 U.2d 52. 376 P.2d 951 
(1962). finds no more appropriate application than in the 
instant case. If the State's position were meritorious. 
then it has nothing to lose by that inquiry. If it is not, 
then to permit the default judgment to stand only 
perpetuates injustice. 
To allow the default judgment against Mr. 
Musselman to stand under these circumstances, allowing the 
State to sieze his assets, pursue his income. and disrupt 
his family when in fact the State has no claim against him, 
and affording him no opportunity to present the defenses 
which he has set forth, would be both contrary to law and a 
grave miscarriage of justice. 
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1982. 
Respectfully submitted this ).3 day of December, 
FOX, EDW RDS & GARDI or 
By~Akd G r: y Heath 
AtO:eYs for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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The foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant on 
Reher~ing was served upon respondent by mailing two copies 
the!-~of to its attorney, Leon A. Halgren, Assistant Attorney 
Ger~ral, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City~ l;T 
BL i.14, this tA3 day of December, 1982. 
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